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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has original appellate jurisdiction 
over this appeal from the judgment in favor of UDOT under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1994). This Court now has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1994). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Third District Court correctly granted summary 
judgment on the ground the Complaint failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
2. Whether the Third District Court correctly granted summary 
judgment on the ground Plaintiff's causes of action were time-
barred • 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues are questions of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 
1993) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes are determinative of certain issues 
raised in the appeal and are supplied verbation in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann, § 63-30-3 (1993). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(6) (1993). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1992). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
A. Nature of Case 
The appeal is from a summary judgment of the Third District 
Court in favor of UDOT ruling that Appellant Henshaw's claims fail 
to state a claim and are time-barred. The claims as to which 
Henshaw appeals are in contract and fraud. 
Henshaw claims that UDOT breached a contract of sale of a 
piece of property because UDOT did not provide a warranty deed and 
title insurance to Henshaw despite his alleged tender of payment 
under the contract. UDOT responds to the contract claims that 
after negotiations UDOT conveyed the property to Henshaw by 
2 
warranty deed for less than the contract price, and purchased title 
insurance and was prepared to have placed in Henshaw's name as soon 
as Henshaw recorded the deed, which he did not do. Henshaw 
tendered no evidence showing he was damaged in any way. 
Henshaw had no right of possession at the time he claims his 
contractual right to quiet possession was breached, having assigned 
his interest away. Further UDOT took no action that could be 
considered a breach of any covenant of quiet possession. 
Henshaw claims fraud (without specifically pleading it) 
because UDOT sold to Henshaw's assignor (Sweeney) property that 
turned out to have title defects. But UDOT completely cleared up 
any title defects and conveyed to Henshaw clear title -- for a 
price lower than the contract required. In any event, the fraud 
claims are barred because of non-compliance with the claim 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
All the claims are time-barred. Plaintiff failed to file any 
claim or complaint within the time required by statute. 
The confusing and deficient nature of Plaintiff's claims are 
introduced by Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, attached hereto 
as Addendum B. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
UDOT is satisfied with Henshaw's statement of the course of 
proceedings and will not repeat it here. The disposition relevant 
to this appeal is the District Court's entry of summary judgment in 
favor of UDOT on September 26, 1994. 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1973, UDOT condemned certain property belonging to Irene 
Sweeney in Emigration Canyon; UDOT satisfied the condemnation 
judgment by trading to Sweeney a portion of the property at issue. 
(R. 378, 383-385, Affid. Williams1 1 4 and Ex. 1; R. 397, Affid. 
1 3.) UDOT and Sweeney believed at the time of transfer that the 
piece of property UDOT transferred to Sweeney in trade had clear 
title, but acknowledge now it did not. (R. 379, Affid. H 5; R. 
533-535, Affid. % 4 and Ex. A.) 
On May 27, 1976, Sweeney and Plaintiff, Dee Henshaw, entered 
into a contract for sale by Sweeney of the property that is the 
subject of this appeal (R. 379, 385-387, Affid. 1 6 and Ex. 2; R. 
397-398, Affid. % 4.) The contract provided in its last paragraph 
as follows: 
It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to 
apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
[R. 386, Affid. Ex. 2.] 
In the spring or summer of 1985, Dee Henshaw contacted Irene 
Sweeney and told her there was a problem with the title of part of 
the property that was the subject of the May 27, 1976 contract of 
sale. (R. 398, Affid. % 5.) This was the first communication 
Sweeney received regarding any problem with the title to the 
1
 The District Court denied Henshaw's Motion to strike 
portions of the Affidavit of Max M. Williams (R.590); reasons for 
denial of the Motion are supplied in UDOT's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion to Strike (R. 502-506). 
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property UDOT had transferred to her and which she had contracted 
to sell to Henshaw, (R. 398, Affid. 1 6.) 
Sweeney thereupon complained to UDOT about the state of the 
title and began to work with UDOT to resolve the problem. Henshaw 
knew then of UDOT's involvement inasmuch as Henshaw himself states 
that in "late August or early September, 1985, Sweeney began to 
refuse to talk to me about the property and would only say she was 
working with UDOT to resolve the problems." (R. 114-115, Affid. 
Henshaw, 1 7).2 
UDOT satisfied Sweeney's complaint about the state of the 
title by purchasing back Sweeney's interest in the property by 
assignment on November 21, 1985 (R. 379, 388-390, Affid. and Ex. 
3) , and the assignment was recorded with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on December 12, 1985. (R. 390.) 
On October 9, 1985, Sweeney had prepared a memorandum to 
Henshaw in which she stated as follows: "I am in the process of 
selling off the Real Estate contract I have with you for the 
purchase of some of my land. It is being purchased by the State of 
Utah." This memorandum communicates, among other things, that the 
2Henshaw also states that when he asked Sweeney why "she would 
no longer accept monthly payments," Sweeney said "she was working 
with UDOT to resolve problems with the property, so she could give 
a warranty deed to the property." (R. 114, Affid. Henshaw, % 6). 
Henshaw further states that in July of 1985 he knew Sweeney was 
"having her attorney work it out with UDOT where she had acquired 
title to the property" (R. 115, Affid. Henshaw, % 9), and that 
Sweeney was stonewalling him beginning in July, 1985. (R. 454-455, 
Affid. Henshaw, % 26) . 
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"closing should take place within two weeks," and directs Henshaw 
to two named UDOT employees. (R. 398, 400, Affid. 1 7 and Ex. 1.) 
On or about the date of the memorandum referred to in the preceding 
paragraph, and in any event by October 10, 1985, Sweeney mailed 
the memorandum to Henshaw in St. George, Utah, to the address he 
had given her for correspondence and which he had written on mail 
he sent to her. (R. 398, 534, Affid. 11 7 and 8 and Affid. 1 5) 
(clarifying the date Sweeney mailed the memorandum)). 
Despite the actual and constructive knowledge Henshaw had in 
1985 of UDOT's involvement in working out the problems with the 
title and Sweeney's refusal to deal with him, Henshaw claims he 
repeatedly tendered the remaining purchase price to Sweeney from 
June 1985 through March 1986,3 without ever making any inquiry of 
UDOT about the matter. 
On December 12, 1986, Dee Henshaw assigned his interest in the 
contract of sale originally between Sweeney and Henshaw, to Melvin 
L. Henshaw and Barbara S. Henshaw, and recorded the document of 
assignment on the same day. (R. 379, 391-392, Affid. 1 9 and Ex. 
4.) Not until August 26, 1991, did Melvin L. Henshaw and Barbara 
S. Henshaw assign back to Dee Henshaw their interest in the 
contract. (R. 380, 393-394, Affid. 1 10 and Ex. 5.) UDOT 
maintains that Henshaw's lack of any legal interest in the property 
during the 1986-1991 period undermines Henshaw's contentions that 
3
 R. 308, 316, 319, Second Amended Complaint, 11 15, 60, 84; 
R. 433, Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Fact, 1 8. 
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he had a right of possession during that time and that his right of 
possession was breached in 1988. 
On October 8, 1986, Proctors (who, it turned out, had an 
interest in the property) conveyed by warranty deed to UDOT 
property included in the property on which Henshaw bases his 
Complaint. UDOT had first become aware in 1985 of Proctor's 
interest in this property that was part of the property UDOT 
conveyed to Sweeney in 1973 and then repurchased from her in 1985. 
The Proctor deed to UDOT was recorded at Book 5858, page 2217 on 
December 30, 1986. (R. 380, 395, Affid. 1 11 and Ex. 6.) This 
conveyance and recordation cured any title defect attributable to 
Proctor's interest. 
In 1988 Salt Lake County contacted Mr. Williams by telephone 
at UDOT offices and stated that certain property was shown on plat 
maps as belonging to UDOT, that there was a flood emergency on that 
property, and that the County needed to go onto the property to 
address the flood problems. (R. 380, Affid. % 12.) This is the 
property Plaintiff refers to in his second and third causes of 
action. Mr. Williams assumed the statements of the County as to 
UDOT's ownership and the County's need were correct. However, UDOT 
did not direct the County to do the County's flood control work and 
UDOT took no part in the flood control operation. (R. 380, Affid. 
1 13.) These facts support UDOT's position that UDOT took no 
action constituting breach of any covenant of quiet possession. 
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In 1991 UDOT became aware of a claim of interest of other 
parties in the property UDOT repurchased from Sweeney in 1985, and 
UDOT purchased that interest from the claiming parties, Richard and 
Lois Brady, through six deeds executed in June and July of 1991, 
all of which were recorded on July 16, 1991. (R. 381, Affid. % 
15 J Henshaw provided no evidentiary proffer to the contrary. 
This purchase and recordation cured any title defect attributable 
to the Brady's interest. 
On August 28, 1991, UDOT conveyed to Henshaw by warranty deed 
the entire property regarding which Plaintiff made his claims. (R. 
381, 396, Affid. 1 16 and Ex. 7.) 
Plaintiff has not filed a notice of claim with the State or 
the Utah Attorney General's office for any injury claimed in this 
action. (R. 362-363, UDOT FACTS, 1 1; R, 438, Henshaw's 
Memorandum.) The original complaint was filed February 6, 1992. 
(R. 2.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court correctly ruled that all of Plaintiff's 
causes of action failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Henshaw stipulated that the third cause of action for an 
alleged taking fails to state a claim. The contract claims (counts 
I, II, and IV) fail to state a claim because the undisputed facts 
demonstrate merger of the contract in the warranty deed UDOT 
delivered to Henshaw on August 28, 1991, and discharge by UDOT's 
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performance or accord and satisfaction through UDOT's delivery of 
the deed, for less than the contract price, and by Henshaw's own 
actions. 
The contract claim asserted in the second cause of action --
for breach of a covenant of quiet possession -- fails to state a 
claim for the additional reasons that Henshaw had no rights of any 
kind in the property at the time of the asserted breach and hence 
no right of possession, having assigned his interest away. That 
contract claim also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted because UDOT did not direct or have any part in the Salt 
Lake County flood control operation Henshaw contends breached the 
covenant of quiet possession. 
The fraud claim (Count V) fails to state a claim because it is 
barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
All of the claims are time barred. The contract claims are 
barred because they accrued, if at all, in July 1985, the time of 
the asserted breach of UDOT's assignor, Sweeney. They were also 
barred at the time of the assignment of the contract to UDOT 
(November 21, 1985) or, at the latest, when Henshaw first learned 
or should have learned of the assignment to UDOT, which was in 
1985. Even the latest of these times was more than six years 
earlier than the filing of the complaint on February 6, 1992, and 
thus the contract claims are time-barred by the six-year statute of 
limitations. 
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The Fraud claim is barred by the one-year notice of claim 
requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and by the three-
year general limitation on fraud actions. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OP UDOT 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THERE IS NO GENUINE DISPUTE AS 
TO ANY MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT AND BECAUSE THE FACTS AS 
CONTENDED BY APPELLANT ENTITLE UDOT TO JUDGMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff claims disputed facts. However, facts Appellant 
himself stated and other undisputed facts entitle UDOT to 
affirmance as a matter of law. See Hunt v. ESI Engineering, Inc., 
808 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (affirming summary 
judgment); Themv v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 529 
(Utah 1979) (affirming summary judgment). These facts will be 
parsed and applied below to each of Appellant's claims 
individually. 
Appellant's remaining assertions are not "genuine issues of 
material fact" as Appellant claims. Many of them have no 
evidentiary basis in the record, they are not material to the 
defenses raised, and they do not preclude summary judgment in 
UDOT's favor under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
"If [disputed facts] would not establish a basis upon which 
plaintiff could recover, no matter how they were resolved, it would 
be useless to consume time, effort and expense in trying them, the 
saving of which is the very purpose of summary judgment procedure." 
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Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.. 7 Utah 2d 53, 55, 318 
P.2d 339, 341 (1957). See also Hecrlar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 
P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (summary judgment is not precluded 
"simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a 
material fact is genuinely controverted"). 
Undisputed facts properly made of record compelled the 
District Court to grant UDOT's motion for Summary Judgment. 
Application of the law to those same facts requires affirmance 
here. 
II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY .JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS THE 
COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The District Court's summary judgment was rendered under Rule 
56 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and not under Rule 52 
as Appellant suggests. In its motion and memorandum UDOT "move[d] 
the court for summary judgment against Plaintiff on all causes of 
action" (R. 360) and urged that " [a]11 of Plaintiff's causes of 
action fail to state a claim." (R. 516.) UDOT's memoranda 
supplied reasons in support. Subsequently, the District Court 
granted UDOT's motion for the reasons stated in UDOT's supporting 
memoranda. Even if the District Court had not stated its grounds, 
which it did by reference, affirmance by this Court is proper 
inasmuch as it "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any 
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied 
11 
on below." Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 
1993) . 
Henshaw stipulated that his third cause of action "may be 
dismissed" because Plaintiff had not filed a notice of claim as 
required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R. 438) . Therefore 
the third cause of action was dismissed upon stipulation. 
A. Any Real Property Aspect of the First Cause of 
Action Fails to State a Claim 
To the extent the first cause is a real property action, it is 
barred by the claim requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 
(1993), a section of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.4 
B. The Second Cause of Action Fails to State a Claim 
The second cause of action is confusingly asserted to include 
a real property claim. Henshaw stated at page 8 of his Memorandum 
that the claim arises from "an equitable interest in property." 
(R. 436.) To any extent it is a property claim, it is barred by 
the claim requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993). 
In any event, the second cause of action, for breach of a 
covenant of quiet possession, fails to state a claim because 
Appellant had no rights of any kind in the property, contract or 
otherwise, at the time of the asserted breach in 1988. Henshaw had 
4
 Appellant incorrectly states that UDOT falsely asserts that 
Mr. Henshaw's First Cause of Action is based on the implied cove-
nant of a Warranty deed. Appellant's Brief at 24. In its memoran-
dum UDOT stated: "However, the basis of Plaintiff's claim is not 
a warranty deed, but a contract to sell property." (R. 397.) 
(Emphasis in original.) 
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assigned his interest to another party in 1986 and did not receive 
the assignment back until 1991. (R. 391-394, Affid., Exs. 4 and 
5). Manifestly, Appellant cannot assert any breach of a covenant 
of quiet enjoyment or possession that may have occurred at a time 
when he had no right of possession, and therefore the second cause 
of action fails to state a claim. 
Moreover, UDOT did nothing that could be construed as 
breaching any covenant of quiet possession regarding the property. 
What happened is stated in the Affidavit of Max M. Williams without 
contravention. In 1988 Salt Lake County contacted Mr. Williams by 
telephone at UDOT offices and stated that certain property was 
shown on plat maps as belonging to UDOT, that there was a flood 
emergency on that property, and that the County needed to go onto 
the property to address the flood problems. (R. 380, Affid. % 12.) 
Mr. Williams assumed the statements of the County as to UDOT's 
ownership and the County's need were correct. Dispositively, UDOT 
did not direct the County to do its flood control work and UDOT 
took no part in the flood control operation. (R. 380, Affid. H 
13.) 
C. All of Plaintiff's Contract Claims (Counts I, 
II, and IV) Fail to State a Claim Because the 
Undisputed Facts Demonstrate Merger of the 
Contract in the Warranty Deed and Discharge by 
UDOT's Performance or Accord and Satisfaction 
and by Appellant's Own Actions. 
Henshaw's wildly vacillating descriptions of counts I, II and 
IV as, variously, express contract, implied contract, real property 
13 
and, if one reads the counts themselves, fraudulent 
representations, show that Appellant himself does not know what 
kind of claim he is asserting in those counts. As already shown, 
if they are property claims, they fail to comply with the 
Governmental Immunity Act, and Appellant has cited no authority to 
show they are cognizable claims in implied contract or fraud. The 
only remaining option is that all three claims sometimes described 
by Henshaw as contract claims are based on the contract's provision 
requiring the seller to supply a warranty deed and title insurance. 
This is the claim that reappears through Henshaw's complaint and 
memorandum. 
However, Henshaw's claim that he was ready to perform and UDOT 
was not is irrelevant for the period December 12, 1986, through 
August 26, 1991, inasmuch as Plaintiff had no interest in the 
contract or property at that time, having assigned it away. (R. 
391-394, Affid., Exs. 4 and 5; R. 488-489 (Henshaw's 
acknowledgement he had assigned it away).) Moreover, the alleged 
documents Henshaw submitted, and the transcripts he submitted as 
Exhibits G through K to the Henshaw Affidavit (R. 457-493), 
actually undercut Appellant's position. Henshaw cannot claim the 
benefit of any of his other inconsistent statements. Kinyon v. 
Cardon. 686 P.2d 1048, 1052, n. 3 (Or. 1984). 
Apart from Henshaw's shocking breach of ethics in recording 
telephone conversations without first informing the other parties 
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he was doing so,5 the transcripts show negotiations that culminated 
in Henshaw receiving in settlement exactly what he requested. 
Moreover, he paid a lower price than the original contract 
required.6 Thus, there was no actionable breach at all. The 
transcripts show good faith discussion regarding, among other 
things, whether UDOT could properly deal with Henshaw directly in 
light of his representation by counsel (Exs. H - November 10, 1986; 
I - December 12, 1986; J - January 5, 1987; and K - January 6, 
1987), the exact amount of the payoff (Exs. G - November 19, 1986; 
and H - November 20, 1986), and whether UDOT would pay Henshaw's 
attorneys fees, which UDOT did (Ex. K - January 6, 1987) . (R. 457-
493.) 
They also show negotiation regarding whether a quit-claim deed 
or warranty deed would be passed ( R. 486-490, Ex. K - January 6, 
1987). Significantly, Henshaw had no interest in the contract at 
the time of these negotiations. UDOT's practice has always been to 
convey property by quit-claim deed, as the original Order of 
Condemnation and the transcript confirm, and it is true that UDOT 
officials were at first reluctant to use a warranty deed. However, 
upon eventual mutual agreement and settlement regarding the 
5
 (R. 537-538, Affid. 1 10.) 
6
 "In our closing meeting with Mr. Henshaw on August 28, 1991, 
at which I was present, UDOT reduced the purchase price of the 
property UDOT was selling to Henshaw below the contractual amount, 
received from Mr. Henshaw the amount of $4,269.20, and delivered to 
Mr. Henshaw the executed warranty deed on the property." (R. 537, 
Affid. 1 5.) 
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numerous elements of the negotiation, UDOT conveyed the property to 
Henshaw by warranty deed just two days after Henshaw reacquired his 
interest in the contract on August 26, 1991. (R. 393, 394, 396, 
Affid., Exs. 5 and 7.) 
When UDOT executed and delivered to Henshaw the Warranty Deed 
conveying the property in question, all provisions of the prior 
contract merged in the deed, and any claim Henshaw had on the 
contract was extinguished. The rule is stated in Utah case law as 
follows: 
Ordinarily when a deed is given in full 
execution of a contract of sale of land, all 
provisions of the prior contract are merged 
therein; and when the merger is denied by a 
party, the burden is upon him to show to the 
contrary by clear and convincing evidence. 
Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1978) (reversing a 
judgment so as to recognize that a prior contract was merged in the 
deed); see also, Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 198 
(1966) (holding that "a merger resulted" when the seller supplied 
to the buyer a deed, and that the warranty deed abrogated the 
preexisting contractual agreement); see generally. 26 C.J.S. Deeds 
§ 91.c. (1956) . 
The barring of claims for damages under a preexisting contract 
that has been merged in a subsequent deed is precisely what the 
doctrine of merger accomplished, merger being a doctrine of repose, 
simplification, and clarification. The term used to indicate the 
effect of merger on the preexisting contract is "abrogate.ff Kelsey 
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v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 198 (1966). The only 
definitions of "abrogate" supplied in Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1976) are: "to abolish by authoritative action," and 
"to do away with." The only rational meaning of that word in this 
context is that as a result of the merger, the contract has no 
further legal existence. Without any legal existence, the contract 
cannot contain any binding term, and without any binding term, no 
damages can flow. No contract, no contractual term, no breach, no 
damages. 
To escape the merger doctrine Henshaw would have to show a 
specific agreement by UDOT to continue the life of the preexisting 
contract. This he has not done, nor could he do so because there 
is no such agreement. If Appellant harbored grievances, he could 
have demanded terms to protect them in the deed. This he did not 
do. 
Appellant bore the burden "to show ... by clear and convincing 
evidence" that merger did not occur. Rasmussen v. Olsen. 583 P.2d 
50, 53 (Utah 1978). Yet he tendered no evidence at all to rebut 
the ordinary understanding that the deed extinguishes the contract. 
Merger operates here to bar any claim Henshaw may assert from the 
now legally non-existent contract. 
Further, under the undisputed facts recited, Appellant's 
contract claims are barred by UDOT's performance. Where a contract 
has "been performed by both parties [it] is terminated and cannot 
be the basis of [an] action" for breach. Morgan Drive Away, Inc. 
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v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America, 166 F. Supp. 885 (S. D. Ind. 1958) affirmed 
268 F. 2d 871 (1959), cert, denied 361 U. S. 896 (1959). 
UDOT'S conveyance for less than the contract price also 
entitles UDOT to the defense of accord and satisfaction. The 
doctrine is stated as follows: 
Accord and satisfaction arises where the parties to 
an agreement resolve that a given performance by one 
party thereto, offered in substitution of the performance 
originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation 
created under the original agreement. Essential to its 
validity are, (1) a proper subject matter; (2) competent 
parties; (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the 
parties; and (4) a consideration given for the accord. 
Suaarhouse Finance Company v. Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1369 (Utah 
1980) (affirming the grant of a motion based on accord and 
satisfaction). See also. Farmland Service Coop., Inc. v. Jack 242 
N. W, 2d 624, 625 (Neb. 1976) ("An executed compromise settlement 
of a good faith controversy is an accord and satisfaction"). Here, 
the settlement of the matter between UDOT and Henshaw by UDOT'S 
delivery and Henshaw's acceptance of the warranty deed, for a price 
less than that required by the contract,7 discharged the contract 
by accord and satisfaction. 
As to Henshaw's claim that UDOT breached the contract by 
failing to obtain title insurance in Appellant's name, it was only 
circumstances created by Appellant himself that prevented UDOT from 
obtaining title insurance in Appellant's name. That is, because 
7
 R. 537, Affid. % 5. 
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Henshaw had not recorded the warranty deed UDOT executed in his 
favor# title companies could not insure the property in Henshaw's 
name. To protect the property, UDOT obtained title insurance in 
its own name, since UDOT was still the record owner, and UDOT was 
at all times prepared to have the insurance placed in Henshaw's 
name if Henshaw would record the deed and so inform UDOT, as UDOT 
advised him to do. (R. 537, 539-545, Affid. M 7, 8 and 9 and Ex. 
A.) This is undisputed. UDOT did all it could do regarding the 
title insurance, and "no one [Henshaw in this case] can avail 
himself of the non-performance of a condition precedent, who has 
himself occasioned its non-performance." Cannon v. Stevens School 
of Business, Inc. , 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977) . See also. Reed 
v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1379 (1980); Haymore v. Levinson, 328 P.2d 
307, 310, 8 Utah 2d 66, 70 (1958). 
In sum, the undisputed facts show that UDOT's responsibilities 
under the contract were discharged by merger of the contract into 
the deed, UDOT's performance or accord and satisfaction and by 
Appellant's own conduct, as a matter of law. 
D. The Fifth Cause of Action Fails to State a 
Claim Because It Is Barred bv the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act 
The fifth cause of action is for an alleged conspiracy to 
defraud. Such a cause fails to state a claim unless it is preceded 
by a notice of claim as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 
(1989). Here, it is undisputed that Appellant has not filed a 
notice of claim against the State under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 
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(1989), (R. 362-363, UDOT FACTS, % 1; R. 438, Henshaw's 
Memorandum.) Section 63-30-12 provides that the claim must be 
filed "regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the 
claim is characterized as governmental." 
Further, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3, UDOT as a State 
entity is immune from suit for any exercise of a governmental 
function, and indeed for "all governmental acts,"8 not specifically 
exempted from the Act. See DeBry v. Noble, 257 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(Utah Sup. Ct. 1995). UDOT's purchase of the contract from Sweeny 
was a "governmental function" related to and necessitated by UDOT's 
condemnation of certain property of Sweeney's for which UDOT traded 
a portion of the property in issue. The key to UDOT's involvement 
was the Condemnation Order of 1973. (R. 383-385, Affid., Ex. 1.) 
The Order provides that the "Plaintiff [State of Utah] did satisfy 
said judgment to the Defendant Irene C. Sweeney, by an exchange of 
surplus property by quit-claim deed designated as Parcel 138-
B:23:STQ." When Henshaw told Sweeney someone else "was claiming 
ownership of one of the lots and asked her if she had clear 
8
 If, as Henshaw claims, the fraud action arose in 1994, that 
action is all the more clearly barred by the amendment in 1987 of 
§ 63-30-2 (4) (a) of the Governmental Immunity Act "which vastly 
expanded the term 'governmental function' and therefore the scope 
of governmental immunity by making all government acts subject to 
immunity, regardless of whether the actions were deemed 'essential' 
'core,' or 'uniquely governmental' activities." Debry v. Noble, 
257 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1995). 
20 
title,"9 Sweeney informed UDOT and UDOT confirmed a title 
problem,10 UDOT purchased Sweeney's interest. 
Sweeney contended she had a claim against the State, and there 
was color of legal claim and proper governmental interest that the 
State not obtain Sweeney's property without just compensation. 
UDOT's purchase of the property from Sweeney was a governmental 
function and a government act stemming from the 1973 condemnation, 
and UDOT is immune under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 from the claims 
of the fifth cause of action challenging the purchase. 
Also, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(6) (1993), immunity of 
a governmental entity for injury that "arises out of . . . a 
misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional" is specifically not waived. Thus, the fifth cause is 
barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.11 
9
 R. 430, Plaintiff's Memorandum -- Statement of Disputed 
Facts, 11 4 and 5. 
10
 R. 364, 365, 378-396, UDOT's opening Memorandum -- UDOT 
FACTS, 11's 9 and 13 and Affidavit. 
11
 Even if Plaintiff had stated a claim, the fifth cause would 
be subject to dismissal for non-compliance with Rule 9 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure that requires the circumstances 
constituting fraud to be stated with particularity. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 9(b) (1991). While Plaintiff has generally alleged that UDOT 
"attempted" to deceive the Plaintiff to take a quit claim deed 
(though in fact UDOT actually conveyed a warranty deed) no other 
particulars are alleged with respect to these asserted 
misrepresentations. (R. at 321, Second Amended Complaint, 1 95.) 
An allegation of fraud must do more than refer to an "attempt" and, 
at a minimum, must supply specificity as to time, content of the 
alleged misrepresentations, method of communicating the 
misrepresentations, and place. See e.g., Debrv v. Noble, 257 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1995); Cook v. Zion's First National 
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Ill 
ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED 
A. The Breach of Contract Claims of the First, 
Second and Fourth Causes of Action Are Time-
barred bv the Six Year Statute of Limitations 
on Written Obligations. 
There is only one contract here, and the statute of 
limitations began to run upon the first breach regardless of 
whether the contract was also later breached. Butcher v. Gilrov, 
744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1987) . Thus# Plaintiff's separation of his 
contract claims into three causes is artificial and meaningless for 
purposes of determining when the statute began to run. 
Plaintiff alleges interactions with Sweeney and actions and 
non-actions of UDOT that determine when UDOT's alleged breach first 
occurred. The Second Amended Complaint alleges in part as follows: 
Beginning in June of 1985, and through March 
of 1986, the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to 
Sweeney the remainder of the purchase price due on 
the property specified in Exhibit No. 1. [R. 308, 
316, 319, Second Amended Complaint, 11 15, 60 and 
84.] 
On or about November 21, 1985, unbeknownst to 
the Plaintiff, Defendant Sweeney assigned her 
interest in the Uniform Real Estate contract 
evidenced by Exhibit No. 1 to UDOT. [R. 308, 316, 
320, Amended Complaint, 11 18, 63, 87.] 
From July 1985, through March 1986, Sweeney 
would not accept payments on the property from the 
Plaintiff. [R. 308, 316, 320, Second Amended 
Complaint, 11 17, 64 and 86.] 
Bank, 645 F.Supp. 423, 425 (D. Utah 1986). 
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These allegations reflect Plaintiff's awareness of Sweeney's 
alleged breach of contract no later than July of 1985. Plaintiff 
knew at that time that Sweeney had not accepted his tenders, and 
that she had not delivered a warranty deed and title insurance. 
The cause of action arose no later than at that point and was 
barred as to Sweeney six years later (in 1991), approximately six 
months before the action was filed on February 6, 1992. 
Essentially on this basis the Court dismissed the contract action 
against Sweeney. 
The allegations also acknowledge that on November 21, 1985, 
Sweeney assigned the contract to UDOT. (R. 308, 316, 320, Second 
Amended Complaint, %% 18, 63 and 87.) With regard to assignment, 
the contract provides in its last paragraph as follows: 
It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid 
are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors, and assigns of the 
respective parties hereto. [R. 386, Affid., Ex. 2 
(emphasis supplied).] 
Henshaw asserts that under this clause UDOT succeeds to 
Sweeney's liabilities to Henshaw. But though Henshaw is willing to 
have UDOT assume Sweeney's liabilities, he objects to UDOT's 
assumption of Sweeney's statute of limitations defense. A clause 
in a contract extending stipulations of the contract to an assign 
or successor eliminates the necessity of express acquisition of 
rights and liabilities, and under such a clause an assignee 
automatically stands in the shoes of the assignor. Citizens 
Surburban Co. v. Rosemount Development Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 551, 244 
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Cal. App. 2d 666 (1966). See also Arkansas Amusement Corp. v. 
Kemper, 57 F.2d 466, 467 (8th Cir. 1932). Thus, UDOT succeeds to 
the initial alleged breach of Sweeney in July of 1985, and UDOT 
succeeds to the statute of limitations defenses of Sweeney. 
If it were not true that an assignee succeeds to the rights 
and liabilities of the assignor, Henshaw would not have succeeded 
to any cause of action Henshaw's assignors had when they assigned 
the contract to Henshaw on August 26, 1991. Under such a scenario, 
Henshaw's rights under the contract began on August 26, 1991 and 
were promptly satisfied when he was presented with a warranty deed 
two days later on August 28, 1991, no breach of Henshaw's 
contractual rights having occurred at all. Henshaw cannot have it 
both ways -- that he succeeds to his assignor's rights but not to 
defenses against those rights. And he cannot say that UDOT 
succeeds to UDOT's assignor's liabilities (the original alleged 
breach of the one and only contract) but not to UDOT's assignor's 
statute of limitations defenses. 
The contract breach Henshaw asserts against UDOT is the same 
breach he asserted against UDOT's assignor -- failure to timely 
convey a warranty deed and purchase title insurance. It is not 
reasonable to conclude that Henshaw acquired the right to sue UDOT 
on that breach, through the assignment, without also acquiring the 
duty of timely diligence in filing an action on it within the time 
fixed by the statute of limitations. 
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Appellant claims he did not know of the assignment until March 
of 1986 and therefore could not make his demand on UDOT until that 
time, (R. 308, 310, 311, 316, Second Amended Complaint, 11 18, 29, 
36 and 63), However, any cause of action for breach of UDOT's 
contractual obligation's accrued when the alleged breach first 
occurred, i.e., under the general rule, when Sweeney's breach 
occurred, or liberally, when UDOT took the assignment on November 
21, 1985 allegedly without informing Plaintiff of it. Becton 
Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) ("mere 
ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent 
the running of the statute of limitations") (quoting from a prior 
case). 
Even under the "discovery rule," applied in exceptional 
circumstances, a cause of action accrues when a claimant, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should learn of the existence of 
his claim. See, e.g., Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, at 1257; 
Campbell v. Loftus. 676 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Wash. 1984). Here, 
Henshaw knew or should have known of the assignment to UDOT in 
1985. The Affidavit of Irene Sweeney (R. 397-400), and the 
clarifying Supplemental Affidavit of Irene Sweeney (R. 533-539), 
establish that Sweeney sent the memorandum conveying her intention 
to assign the contract to UDOT to Henshaw at the address he 
provided her, "on or about," October 9, 1985 and no later than 
October 10, 1985. And she stated that the assignment would occur 
within two weeks. Henshaw's evidence does not dispute this. 
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Further, Henshaw knew that UDOT was involved in attempting to 
resolve the title problems with the property in late August or 
early September, 1985: 
In late August or early September, 1985, 
Sweeney began to refuse to talk to me about the 
property and would only say that she was working 
with UDOT to resolve the problems- [R. 114-115, 
Affid. 1 7.] 
I contacted Sweeney numerous times to get the 
payoff figure, however, she never provided me with 
a payoff figure, and she stated that she would no 
longer accept the monthly payments. When I asked 
why, Sweeney stated that she was working with her 
attorney and with UDOT to resolve problems with the 
property, so that she could give me a warranty deed 
to the property. [R. 114, Affid. 1 6 (emphasis 
supplied) . ] 1 2 
Also according to Henshaw, Henshaw knew that in July of 1985 
Sweeney was "having her attorney work it out with UDOT where she 
had acquired title to the property" (R. 115, Affid. Henshaw, 1 9) , 
and Sweeney stonewalled Henshaw beginning in July, 1985. (R. 454-
455, Affid. 1 26). 
Significantly, UDOT recorded the assignment from Sweeney on 
December 12, 1985. (R. 390, Affid., Ex. 3.) In view of Henshaw's 
awareness in 1985 of Sweeney and UDOT working to resolve the 
problems with the title, just before and during the time-period of 
the assignment and recordation, the recordation supplied far more 
than the usual "constructive" knowledge given by document 
12
 In fact, it was Henshaw himself, in 1985, who first informed 
Sweeney that there were title problems with the property. (R. 398, 
Affid. 11 5 and 6.) 
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recordation and sufficient to supply notice.13 Despite all these 
facts, Henshaw does not claim to have made any inquiry of UDOT in 
1985 (or before March of 1986) regarding UDOT's position with 
regard to the property In short, Henshaw learned or should have 
learned in 1985 (or before February 6, 1986) that Sweeney had 
assigned the contract to UDOT. 
These undisputed facts and circumstances coupled with 
Henshaw's claims that " [beginning in June of 1985 and through March 
of 1986, the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to Sweeney the remainder 
of the purchase price",14 require Plaintiff's alleged .demands on 
Sweeney to be taken as demands on UDOT. Henshaw cannot enjoy the 
benefit of claiming a breach by the obligor (Sweeney and UDOT) and 
at the same time avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, by 
making demands creating the breach not on a party he knows or 
should know is a current obligor (UDOT) , but on a prior obligor 
(Sweeney). Again, "no one can avail himself of the non-performance 
of a condition precedent, who has himself occasioned its non-
13
 In McConkie v. Hartman. 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974), the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment that an action under a real 
estate contract and for fraud was time-barred. The Court upheld 
findings of the lower court that "all of the circumstances existing 
at or about the time the deeds were recorded were such as to 
furnish full opportunity to the plaintiffs for the discovery of the 
mistake or fraud, if any existed [,and] that more than eight years 
had elapsed since the time for reasonable inquiry on the part of 
the plaintiff would have revealed the mistake or fraud to the time 
of filing their complaint". Id. at 802. 
14
 R. 308, 316, 319, Second Amended Complaint, 11 15, 60, 84; 
see also R. 433, Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Fact, 1 8. 
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performance." Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 
1383, 1385 (Utah 1977). 
The statute of limitations on Plaintiff's contract-claims 
against UDOT accrued at the time of Sweeney's breach, or possibly 
at the time of the assignment of the contract to UDOT on November 
21, 1985. At the latest, the statute began to run when Henshaw 
first learned or should have learned of the assignment, which was 
in 1985. Thus, any contract claims of the first, second and fourth 
causes of action filed more than six years later on February 6, 
1992, are barred by the six-year statute.15 
B. The Fraudulent Conspiracy Claim of the Fifth Cause of 
Action is Time-barred by the Governmental Immunity Act 
and by the General Three-year Rule. 
The fifth cause of action for conspiracy to defraud is time-
barred under the one-year rule of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989), 
inasmuch as no notice of claim was filed within one year (or at 
all) after Henshaw first knew or should have known of the alleged 
fraud, as shown above in argument III A, and was not filed within 
one year of the time even Henshaw asserts he was informed in March 
of 1986 by UDOT of the assignment of the contract to UDOT and was 
15
 The fact that Defendants allegedly continued to violate the 
contract and to refuse Plaintiff's subsequent tenders is 
irrelevant, as the Court ruled in dismissing the claims against 
Sweeney, since the statute commenced to run when the cause of 
action accrued. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1991); Davidson 
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Investment, Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 
(Utah 1990) . The fact that the breach allegedly continued 
thereafter does not extend or toll the statute of limitations as 
such a construction would create a perpetual limitations period. 
28 
aware of UDOT's alleged refusals. (R. 308, 310, 311, 316, Second 
Amended Complaint, M 18, 29, 36 and 63 (Henshaw's allegations 
regarding learning of the assignment in March of 1986)). 
The supposed new fact Plaintiff now "finds" in Defendants' 
1994 answer to Defendant's Second Amended Complaint -- that UDOT 
apparently deeded only a right-of-way to Sweeney in 1983 -- is 
transparently immaterial.16 The salient feature of Plaintiff's 
claim that the title was defective is just that -- that the title 
was defective. Whether the defect took the form of a transfer of 
a right-of-way rather than a fee because UDOT was unaware of the 
extent of the title, or took some other form, is immaterial. What 
is material is that Plaintiff knew of title defects in 1985 when he 
himself told Sweeney someone else was claiming an interest in the 
property and he was aware Sweeney was working with UDOT to resolve 
the problems with the property so he could be transferred a 
warranty deed.17 Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action alleging a 
16
 The deed UDOT and Sweeney both thought transferred fee title 
in 1973 shows on its face that it is for a fee interest. (R. 535, 
Affid., Ex. A.) That it was reasonable to think title was clear is 
underscored by Henshaw's acknowledgement that "nothing in fact ever 
showed up on" the several title reports he had obtained. (R. 491.) 
Also, Henshaw incorrectly states or implies that UDOT did not 
supply a copy of this deed in connection with its motion for 
summary judgment. (Henshaw's Brief, 21.) 
17
 UDOT went the extra mile in clearing up any title problems 
by purchasing the Proctor claim in 1986 (Affid., Ex. 6), taking 
back the property from Sweeney, and later, when it first became 
aware in 1991 of the Brady claim (Affid. % 15) , purchasing that 
interest also, all so Plaintiff's property interest would be 
unimpaired. Henshaw's claim that UDOT knew of the Brady claim at 
some earlier time is not supported by any tender of evidence. 
29 
conspiracy between Sweeney and UDOT to defraud Plaintiff is time-
barred by the one-year rule of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12, as well 
as the three-year statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
26 (1992). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above the District Court's Summary 
Judgment based on rulings that the complaint fails to state a claim 
and is time barred should be affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM A 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical 
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are 
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and 
are considered to be governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician be-
cause of the high risk nature of the patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-
owned university hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians 
employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their 
employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care 
or treatment at another medical facility in Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned uni-
versity hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned univer-
sity acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is 
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state, 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the limits established in 
Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board 
of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmen-
tal entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental 
entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from 
suit for any iiyury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions 
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
• • • • (6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional; 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; 
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of under-
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such 
waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, in-
cluding actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where 
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the posses-
sion of the animal by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that 
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other 
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this 
state. 
(5) An action to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-8, except 
that the cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows 
or reasonably should know of the harm suffered. 
ADDENDUM B 
Charles A. Schultz (4760) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 1516 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Telephone: (801) 944-8804 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—-oooOooo— 
DEE HENSHAW, : 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, a political Civil No. 920900687CN 
subdivision of the state of : 
Utah and Ireene Sweeney, 
: Judge: J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants. 
—oooOooo— 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff and complains and 
alleges of the Defendants, for cause, as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. The Plaintiff is presently a resident of Wayne County 
State of Utah, however, at all times prior to the actions and 
omissions complained of herein the Plaintiff was a resident of 
Washington County, State of Utah. 
2. The Defendant, the Utah Department of Transportation 
(hereinafter, nUDOT"), is a political subdivision of the State of 
Utah. 
3. UDOT is amenable to suit pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as Amended Section 63-30-5• 
4. Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as Amended Section 63-30-5, the Plaintiff is not required to 
comply with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
Amended Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-
15, or 63-30-19 before filing suit against UDOT* 
5. Ireene Sweeney is, and at all times herein pertinent 
was, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah* 
6. The contract that is the subject of this law suit was 
entered into in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7. Venue is proper in the Third District Court, subject to 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended section 
63-30-17 and 78-13-7. 
8. Jurisdiction is vested in the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as Amended Section 78-3-4. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
9. The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs Nos. 1 through 8 of this Complaint and incorporates 
them as if fully set forth by this reference. 
10. On May 27, 1976, the Plaintiff entered into a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract with Irene C. Sweeney (hereinafter, 
HSweeneylf) for the purchase of certain real property located in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
11. That Uniform Real Estate Contract was recorded in the 
Salt Lake County Recorders Office in Book 4944, pages 63-65. 
12. The terms of the contract are specifically set forth in 
the Uniform Sales Contract attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 
No. 1., and the referenced property is more completely described 
in Exhibit No. 1. 
13. Sweeney had previously been deeded the referenced 
property by the Defendant UDOT. 
14. Based on the information available to the Plaintiff, it 
appears that at the time UDOT deeded the referenced property to 
Defendant Sweeney, UDOT did not have clear title to the property. 
15. Beginning in June of 1985, and through March of 1986, 
the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to Sweeney the remainder of the 
purchase price due on the property specified in Exhibit No. 1. 
16. Initially, Sweeney negotiated with the Plaintiff to 
determine the pay-off amount on the property, but beginning in 
July 1985, Sweeney would no longer accept the Plaintiff's 
payments on the property and would not discuss a payoff with the 
Plaintiff. 
17. From July 1985, through March 1986, Sweeney would not 
accept payments on the property from the Plaintiff. 
18. Unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, on or about November 21, 
1985, Defendant Sweeney assigned her interest in the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract evidenced by Exhibit No. 1 to UDOT. A copy of 
that assignment is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit No. 2. 
19. In March of 1986, the Plaintiff was informed by UDOT 
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that UDOT had been assigned Sweeneyfs interest in Exhibit No. 1. 
20. From March of 1986, through January the Plaintiff 
tendered monthly payments specified under the terms of Exhibit 
No. 1 to UDOT. However, UDOT refused to accept any payments 
until January 1987, at which time UDOT accepted eighteen months 
of payments, only enough to bring the payments current. 
21. In December 1986, the Plaintiff tendered a final 
payment for the property to UDOT; however, UDOT refused to accept 
the final payment. 
22. Beginning in March of 1986 and continuing through 
August of 1991, the Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to make a 
final payment on the property to UDOT. 
23. UDOT, however refused to accept a final payment from 
the Plaintiff unless: i) the Plaintiff would accept a "Quit 
Claim Deed91 from UDOT in lieu of a warranty deed, and ii) unless 
the Plaintiff would sign a Release, absolving UDOT from all 
liability, of any nature whatsoever, with respect to the 
Plaintifffs purchase of the property. 
24. From March 1986, through August 1991, UDOT continually 
refused to: 
i) abide by the terms of Exhibit No. 1, 
ii) to accept the Plaintifffs offers of payment, and 
iii) to provide the Plaintiff with a warranty deed and 
property insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1. 
25. UDOT continually insisted that the Plaintiff had to 
accept a quit claim deed rather than a warranty deed and that the 
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Plaintiff had to sign the referenced release, releasing UDOT from 
all liability with respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the 
property. 
26. As a direct and proximate result of UDOTfs failure and 
refusal to honor its obligations under the express terms of 
Exhibit No. 1 and UDOT's refusal to provide the Plaintiff with a 
warranty deed to the property and title insurance on the 
property, the Plaintiff was unable to obtain clear title to the 
referenced property. 
27. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's failure and 
refusal to abide by its obligations as set forth in Exhibit No. 
1, the Plaintiff was denied the use and benefit of the property. 
28. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's failure and 
refusal to abide by the obligations required of it under the 
express provisions of Exhibit No. 1, the Plaintiff has been 
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
mSTCAVW OFACTION 
(Breach of Contract, "Covenant to Convey Title11) 
29. The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs Nos. 1 through 28 of this Complaint and incorporates 
them as if fully set forth by this reference. 
30. The express terms of Exhibit No. 1, require UDOT to 
provide the Plaintiff with a Warranty Deed and with title 
insurance when the Plaintiff has fully paid the purchase price 
for the property. 
31. Beginning in March of 1986 and continuing through 
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August 1991, the Plaintiff continually tendered UDOT the 
remaining amount due on Exhibit No. 1; however, UDOT failed and 
refused to accept the Plaintiff's payment and also failed and 
refused to provide the Plaintiff with a Warranty Deed and title 
insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1. 
32. From March 1986, through August 1991, UDOT failed and 
refused to honor its obligation under the provisions of Exhibit 
No. 1 and failed to provide the Plaintiff with Warranty Deed and 
title insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1. 
33. UDOT has not yet provided the Plaintiff and/or his 
assigns with tile insurance, as required by the contract. 
34. The failure and refusal of UDOT to abide by its 
obligations as set forth in Exhibit No. 1, to accept the 
Plaintiff's payments on the Contract, provide the Plaintiff with 
a Warranty Deed and provide the Plaintiff with title insurance 
constitutes breach of contract on the part of UDOT. 
35. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's breach of 
contract, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract/Covenant of Possession and Quiet Enjoyment") 
36. The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs Nos. 1 through 35 of his Complaint and incorporates 
them as if fully set forth by this reference. 
37. On or about November 16, 1988# UDOT, through Max 
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Williams, authorized Salt Lake County Flood Control to go upon 
the Plaintiffs property and construct a debris basin on the 
Plaintiff's property. 
38. At the time UDOT authorized Salt Lake County Flood 
Control to go upon the Plaintiff's property and construct the 
referenced flood debris basin, UDOT told Salt Lake County Flood 
Control that the Plaintiff did not own the property and 
represented to Salt Lake County Flood Control that UDOT, not the 
Plaintiff, owned the property. 
39. Acting on the representations of UDOT and over the 
objections of the Plaintiff, Salt Lake County Flood Control went 
upon the Plaintiff's property, destroying his gate, damaging 
and/or destroying his well, removed all of the top soil from the 
property and constructed a debris basin on the property. 
40. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's fraudulent 
representations, the Plaintiff's property was damaged in an 
irreparable manner by Salt Lake County Flood Control. 
41. At the time UDOT made its representations to Salt Lake 
County Flood Control, UDOT and/or the State of Utah owned other 
property on which the debris basin could have been built. 
42. It was not necessary that the referenced basin be built 
on the Plaintiff's property; if it was necessary to build a 
debris basin, the debris basin could have been built somewhere 
other than on the Plaintiff's property. 
43. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's fraudulent 
representations, in giving permission for construction of the 
7 
debris basin upon the Plaintiff's property, the value and utility 
of the Plaintifffs property has been diminished in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
44. UDOT's fraudulent representations that it owned the 
Plaintiff's property and UDOT's improper and illegal 
authorization given to Salt Lake County Flood Control, permitting 
Salt Lake County Flood Control to build a debris basin on the 
Plaintifffs property constitutes a breach of UDOTfs contract with 
the Plaintiff, i.e., a breach of UDOTfs covenant of quiet 
enjoyment to the property. 
45. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's breach of 
its Covenant of Possession and Quiet Enjoyment, the Plaintiff has 
been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Unlawful Taking) 
46. The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs Nos. 1 through 45 of this Complaint and incorporates 
them as if fully set forth by this reference. 
47. On or about November 16, 1988, UDOT, through Max 
Williams, authorized Salt Lake County Flood Control to go upon 
the Plaintiff9s property and construct a debris basin on the 
Plaintifffs property. 
46. At the time UDOT authorized Salt Lake County Flood 
Control to go upon the Plaintifffs property and construct the 
referenced flood debris basin, UDOT told Salt Lake County Flood 
Control that the Plaintiff did not own the property and 
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represented to Salt Lake County Flood Control that UDOT, not the 
Plaintiff, owned the property, 
47. Acting on the representations of UDOT and over the 
objections of the Plaintiff, Salt Lake County Flood Control went 
upon the Plaintiff's property, destroying his gate, damaging 
and/or destroying his well, removed all of the top soil from the 
property and constructed a debris basin on the property. 
48. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's fraudulent 
representations, the Plaintiff's property was damaged in an 
irreparable manner by Salt Lake County Flood Control. 
49. At the time UDOT made its representations to- Salt Lake 
County Flood Control, UDOT and/or the State of Utah owned other 
property on which the debris basin could have been built. 
50. At the time UDOT authorized Salt Lake County Flood 
Control to enter upon the Plaintiff's property and construct the 
referenced debris basin, there was no flood emergency and no 
threat of any flood emergency. 
51. UDOT's unauthorized and unlawful authorization to Salt 
Lake County Flood Control to enter on Plaintiff's property and 
unauthorized and unlawful authorization given to Salt Lake City 
Flood Control to build a debris basin on Plaintiff's property 
constitutes an unlawful and impermissible taking of the 
Plaintiff's property on the part of UDOT. 
52. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's unlawful and 
impermissible taking of the Plaintiff's property and the 
unauthorized and unlawful authorization to Salt Lake County Flood 
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Control for the construction of the debris basin upon the 
Plaintiff's property, the value and utility of the Plaintiff's 
property has been diminished in an amount to be proven at trial• 
53. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's unlawful 
taking of the Plaintiff's property the Plaintiff has been damaged 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
FOURTH CA USE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
54. The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs Nos. 1 through 53 of this Complaint and incorporates 
them as if fully set forth by this reference. 
55. On May 27, 1976# the Plaintiff entered into a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract with Irene C Sweeney (hereinafter, 
•'Sweeney") for the purchase of certain real property located in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
56. That Uniform Real Estate Contract was recorded in the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office in Book 4944, pages 63-65. 
57. The terms of the contract are specifically set forth in 
the Uniform Sales Contract attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 
No. 1., and the referenced property is more completely described 
in Exhibit No. 1. 
58. Sweeney had previously been deeded the referenced 
property by the Defendant. 
59. Based on the information available to the Plaintiff, it 
appears that at the time UD0T deeded the referenced property to 
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Defendant Sweeney, UDOT did not have clear title to the property. 
60. Beginning in June of 1985 and through March of 1986, 
the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to Sweeney the remainder of the 
purchase price due on the property specified in Exhibit No. 1. 
61. Initially, Sweeney negotiated with the Plaintiff to 
determine the pay-off amount on the property, but beginning in 
July 1985, Sweeney would no longer accept the Plaintiff's 
payments on the property and would not discuss a payoff with the 
Plaintiff. 
62. From July 1985, through March 1986, Sweeney would not 
accept payments on the property from the Plaintiff. 
63. On or about November 21, 1985, unbeknownst to the 
Plaintiff, Defendant Sweeney assigned her interest in the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract evidenced by Exhibit No. 1 to UDOT. 
64. In March of 1986, the Plaintiff was informed by UDOT 
that UDOT had been assigned Sweeney's interest in Exhibit No. 1. 
65. From March of 1986, through January the Plaintiff 
tendered monthly payments specified under the terms of Exhibit 
No. 1 to UDOT. However, UDOT refused to accept any payments 
until January 1987, at which time UDOT accepted eighteen months 
of payments, only enough to bring the payments current. 
66. In December 1986, the Plaintiff tendered a final 
payment for the property to UDOT; however, UDOT refused to accept 
the final payment. 
67. Beginning in March of 1986, and continuing through 
August of 1991, the Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to make a 
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final payment on the property to UDOT. 
68. UDOT, however refused to accept a final payment from 
the Plaintiff unless: 
i)' the Plaintiff would accept a "Quit Claim DeedM from UDOT 
in lieu of a warranty deed, and 
ii) unless the Plaintiff would sign a Release, absolving 
UDOT from all liability, of any nature whatsoever, with 
respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the property. 
69. From March 1986 through August 1991, UDOT continually 
refused to: 
i) abide by the terms of Exhibit No. 1, and 
ii) to accept the Plaintiff's offers of payment and to 
provide the Plaintiff with a warranty deed and property 
insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1. 
70. UDOT continually insisted that the Plaintiff had to 
accept a quit claim deed rather than a warranty deed and that the 
Plaintiff had to sign the referenced release, releasing UDOT from 
all liability with respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the 
property before UDOT would preform its obligations under the 
contract. 
71. At the time UDOT attempted to force the Plaintiff to 
accept a quit claim deed in lieu of the Warranty Deed required by 
the Contract, UDOT knew that it did not have clear title to the 
property; nonetheless, UDOT attempted to deceive the Plaintiff 
into talcing a quit Claim Deed in lieu of the Warranty Deed, 
required to be delivered by the terms of the contract. 
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72. The actions of UDOT in attempting to force the 
Plaintiff into accepting a quit claim deed in lieu of the 
Warranty Deed, required by the Contract, when UDOT knew that it 
did not have clear title to the property constitutes a breach of 
UDOT's covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the 
Plaintiff. 
73. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's failure and 
refusal to honor its obligations under the express terms of 
Exhibit No. 1, UDOTfs refusal to provide the Plaintiff with a 
warranty deed to the property, UDOTfs failure and refusal to 
provide the Plaintiff with title insurance on the property, and 
UDOT's attempt to defraud the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was unable 
to obtain clear title to the referenced property. 
74. As a direct and proximate result of UDOTfs actions 
and/or inactions, the Plaintiff was denied the use and benefit of 
the property. 
75. UDOT's failure and refusal to provide the Plaintiff 
with a warranty deed to the property, UD0Tfs failure and refusal 
to provide the Plaintiff with title insurance on the property, 
and UDOT's attempt to defraud the Plaintiff, constitute a breach 
of UDOT's covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the 
Plaintiff. 
76. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT9s actions 
and/or inactions, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Conspiracy to Defraud) 
77. The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs Nos. 1 through 76 of this Complaint and incorporates 
them as if fully set forth by this reference. 
78. On May 27, 1976, the Plaintiff entered into a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract with Irene C. Sweeney (hereinafter, 
••Sweeney11) for the purchase of certain real property located in 
Salt Lake County State of Utah. 
79. That Uniform Real Estate Contract was recorded in the 
Salt Lake County Recorderfs Office in Book 4944, pages 63-65. 
80. The terms of the contract are specifically set forth in 
the Uniform Sales Contract attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 
No. 1., and the referenced property is more completely described 
in Exhibit No. 1. 
82. Sweeney had previously been deeded the referenced 
property by the Defendant. 
83. Based on the information available to the Plaintiff, it 
appears that at the time UDOT deeded the referenced property to 
Defendant Sweeney, UDOT did not have clear title to the property. 
84. Beginning in June of 1985, and through March of 1986, 
the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to Sweeney the remainder of the 
purchase price due on the property specified in Exhibit No. 1. 
85. Initially, Sweeney negotiated with the Plaintiff to 
determine the pay-off amount on the property, but beginning in 
July 1985, Sweeney would no longer accept the Plaintiff's 
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payments on the property and would not discuss a payoff with the 
Plaintiff. 
86. From July 1985, through March 1986, Sweeney would not 
accept payments on the property from the Plaintiff. 
87. On or about November 21, 1985, unbeknownst to the 
Plaintiff, Defendant Sweeney assigned her interest in the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract evidenced by Exhibit No. 1 to UDOT. 
88. In March of 1986, the Plaintiff was informed by UDOT 
that UDOT had been assigned Sweeney's interest in Exhibit No. 1. 
89. From March of 1986, through January the Plaintiff 
tendered monthly payments specified under the terms of.Exhibit 
No. 1 to UDOT. However, UDOT refused to accept any payments 
until January 1987, at which time UDOT accepted eighteen months 
of payments, only enough to bring the payments current. 
90. In December 1986, the Plaintiff tendered a final 
payment for the property to UDOT; however, UDOT refused to accept 
the final payment. 
91. Beginning in March of 1986, and continuing through 
August of 1991, the Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to make a 
final payment on the property to UDOT. 
92. UDOT, however refused to accept a final payment from 
the Plaintiff unless: 
i) the Plaintiff would accept a "Quit Claim Deed11 from UDOT 
in lieu of a warranty deed, and 
ii) unless the Plaintiff would sign a Release, absolving 
UDOT from all liability, of any nature whatsoever, with 
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respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the property. 
93. From March 1986# through August 1991# UDOT continually 
refused to: 
i) abide by the terms of Exhibit No. 1, and 
ii) to accept the Plaintiff's offers of payment and to 
provide the Plaintiff with a warranty deed and property 
insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1. 
94. UDOT continually insisted that the Plaintiff had to 
accept a quit claim deed rather than a warranty deed and that the 
Plaintiff had to sign the referenced release, releasing UDOT from 
all liability with respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the 
property. 
95. At the time UDOT attempted to force the Plaintiff to 
accept a quit claim deed in lieu of the Warranty Deed required by 
the Contract, UDOT knew that it did not have clear title to the 
property; nonetheless, UDOT attempted to deceive the Plaintiff 
into taking a quit Claim Deed in lieu of the Warranty Deed, 
required to be delivered by the terms of the contract. 
96. The actions of UDOT in attempting to force the 
Plaintiff into accepting a quit claim deed in lieu of the 
Warranty Deed, required by the Contract, when UDOT knew that it 
did not have clear title to the property constitutes a conspiracy 
to defraud the Plaintiff on the part of UDOT. 
97. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's failure and 
refusal to honor its obligations under the express terms of 
Exhibit No. 1, UDOT's refusal to provide the Plaintiff with a 
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Warranty Deed to the property, UDOTfs failure and refusal to 
provide the Plaintiff with title insurance on the property and 
UDOTfs attempt to defraud the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was unable 
to obtain clear title to the referenced property. 
98. As a direct and proximate result of UDOTfs actions 
and/or inactions, the Plaintiff was denied the use and benefit of 
the property. 
99. UDOT's failure and refusal to provide the Plaintiff 
with a warranty deed to the property, UDOT's failure and refusal 
to provide the Plaintiff with title insurance on the property and 
UDOT's attempt to defraud the Plaintiff constitute a Conspiracy 
on the part of UDOT to defraud the Plaintiff. 
100. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's actions 
and/or inactions, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for relief as follows. 
On the Plaintiff's First Cause of Action. 
1. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
2. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
3. for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting 
to secure title to the property from March 1986 through August 
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1991; 
4. for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by 
statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in 
this matter is entered; 
5. for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as 
provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is 
entered until judgment is satisfied in full; 
6. for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action, as provide for by Exhibit No. 1; 
7. for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No. 1; 
8. for such other and additional relief as the court deems 
just and proper under the facts of this case. 
On the Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action. 
1. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
2. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
3. for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting 
to secure title to the property from March 1986, through August 
1991; 
4. for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by 
statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in 
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this matter is entered; 
5. for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as 
provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is 
entered- until judgment is satisfied in full; 
6. for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action, as provided for by Exhibit No. 1; 
7. for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No. 1; 
8. for such other and additional relief as the court deems 
just and proper under the facts of this case. 
On the Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action. 
1. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
2. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
3. for damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of UDOT's unlawful taking of Plaintiff's 
property. 
4. for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting 
to secure title to the property from March 1986, through August 
1991; 
5# for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by 
statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in 
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this matter is entered; 
6. for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as 
provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is 
entered until judgment is satisfied in full; 
7. for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action, as provided for by Exhibit No. 1; 
8. for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No* 1; 
9. for such other and additional relief as the court deems 
just and proper under the facts of this case. 
On the Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action. 
1. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
2. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
3. for damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of UDOT's breach of its covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
4. for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting 
to secure title to the property from March 1986f through August 
1991; 
5. for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by 
statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in 
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this matter is entered; 
6. for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as 
provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is 
entered until judgment is satisfied in full; 
7. for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action, as provided for by Exhibit No. 1; 
8. for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No. 1; 
9. for such other and additional relief as the court deems 
just and proper under the facts of this case. 
On the Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action: 
1. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
2. for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the 
property from November 1985, through August 1991; 
3. for damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a direct and 
proximate result of UDOT's breach of its covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
4. for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting 
to secure title to the property from March 1986, through August 
1991; 
5. for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by 
statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in 
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this matter is entered; 
6. for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as 
provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is 
entered until judgment is satisfied in full; 
7. for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action, as provide for by Exhibit No. 1; 
8. for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No, 1; 
9. for such other and additional relief as the court deems 
just and proper under the facts of this case. 
Dated this fr ' day of June 1994. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
22 
